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Contrary to the informed consensus, time travel implies spontane-
ity (as distinct from chance) so that time travel can only be of the
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No patient who recovers without
a physician can logically
attribute his recovery to
spontaneity. Indeed, under a
close examination spontaneity
disappears. For everything that
occurs will be found to do so
through something, and this
‘through something’ shows that
spontaneity is a mere name and
has no reality. Medicine,
however, because it acts
‘through something’ and
because its results may be
forecasted, has reality.
Hippocrates: The Art∗
1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper I consider time travel both as a real physical possibility and
as a means of re-examining fundamental assumptions about time. Though
stemming from a new mathematical model of the evolutionary equations of
physics, the arguments in this paper are robust enough to be stated with the
∗cited in S. Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, reprint 1987, Routledge and Keegan
Paul, London, p. 51–52.
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technicalities only in the background. Such a style of exposition also seems
desirable in view of the widespread interest in time-travel.
1.1 Background
Thorne and his consortium have proposed1 time machines based on ‘worm-
hole’ solutions, exploiting the fact that the Hilbert-Einstein equations are
silent about the (algebraic) topology of spacetime. While the ‘wormhole’
solutions involve ‘exotic matter’—matter with negative mass and positively
amusing properties2—Gott3 has shown that closed timelike curves (CTCs)
may also arise with cosmic strings. On the other hand, Hawking4 has argued
that there is excellent empirical evidence for chronology protection since we
have not been invaded by hordes of tourists from the future.
1.2 Two kinds of time-travel
For the purposes of this paper it helps to make an informal distinction be-
tween two types of time travel: (i) with time-machines and (ii) without
machines. An example of the second kind of time travel is transfer of infor-
mation using a retarded interaction going forward in time and an advanced
interaction returning backward in time.5 Access to advanced interactions6 is
possible under the hypothesis of a microphysical tilt in the arrow of time.7
Strictly speaking, a ‘tilt’ does not involve any new hypothesis; the usual hy-
pothesis of ‘causality’ is rejected, so that the evolution of a many-particle
system is governed by a different category of (mixed-type functional differ-
ential) equations of motion.
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Time travel of the second kind contemplates only transfer of information
without involving physical transport of the traveler’s body. Nevertheless,
some (diminished) kind of intervention in the past is possible, in principle,
because information may be transferred from present to past using advanced
interactions, though the bandwidth is a very small fraction of the bandwidth
for information transfer to the future using retarded interactions.
1.3 Aim
The aim of this paper is to stand on its head the standard conclusion derived
from the paradoxes of time travel,8 especially for the case of time travel
without machines.
2 THE PARADOXES OF TIME TRAVEL
2.1 The grandfather paradox
The grandfather paradox is well-known:9 Tim travels into the past to kill
his grandfather when Grandfather was yet a boy; but that would mean that
Tim could not have been born and so could not have killed Grandfather. The
generally accepted conclusion is as follows. Since Tim did not kill Grand-
father in the ‘original’ 1921, consistency demands that neither does he kill
Grandfather in the ‘new’ 1921. The time traveler must be prepared for un-
expected constraints; Tim must fail in the enterprise of killing Grandfather
for some commonplace reason. Perhaps some noise distracts him at the last
moment, perhaps he misses despite much target practice, perhaps even Tim
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killed Grandfather only to discover his true antecedents! As summarised by
Woodward,10 ‘Time travel makes “free will” irrelevant’.
2.2 Mundane time
One could elaborate the paradox as follows. Mundane time has a structure11
which is past linear and future branching (Fig. 1). If one bends it around in
a circle and joins future to past then either future branching or past linearity
must fail, so that one obtains the supercyclic time of Fig. 2.
Figure 1: Mundane time: In everyday life, one philosophizes about the
past but agonizes about the future on the belief that one’s actions partly
decide the future, but leave the past unaffected.
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Figure 2: Supercyclic time: All instants of time are arranged in a closed
cycle, so that any instant ‘precedes’ any other. Such a situation cannot be
readily described with the binary earlier-later relation implicit in the tense-
structure of Indo-European languages.
2.3 Popper’s record postulate
Why not give up past linearity? This could be problematic, since the sig-
nificance of experimental records would then diminish, for an experimental
record could not, then, claim to represent the past. Popper12 proposed a
record postulate, the ‘principle of the unbroken connection of world lines’
which he formulated in operational terms as follows.
Any ‘observer’ (local material system) can begin, at any instant,
a record (causal trace); make successive entries into that record;
and arrange for the preservation of the record for any desired
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finite period of time. (By ‘can’ the following is meant; the theo-
retical possibility of any world-line, to be considered as consistent
with the laws of nature, must not entail the impossibility of the
operations described in the above principle.)
World lines closed in time now lead to a contradiction, since, for consis-
tency, the closed world line ‘must be infinitely and absolutely repetitive,’ and
hence ‘would entail periodic destruction of every single record,’ since other-
wise the record ‘would not be fully repetitive but would constantly enrich
itself upon every renewal of the closed journey.’
2.4 The chronology condition
Appeal to the future branching alone is also adequate. ‘The same result may
be obtained, even less ad hoc,’ continues Popper, ‘by adopting a “principle
of indeterminism”; this too would automatically exclude all cosmological so-
lutions permitting closed world-lines.’ Hawking and Ellis13 similarly argue
that future branching cannot be lightly rejected, since ‘all of our philoso-
phy of science is based on the assumption that one is free to perform any
experiment.’ Hence, they are ‘much more ready to believe’ their chronology
condition, viz. that there are no CTCs. (Hawking’s latest position, marks
a retreat from postulate to conjecture, and adds the bit about making the
universe safe for historians.)
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2.5 The paradoxes re-examined
In brief, the informed consensus favours the standard conclusion14 that time
travel is antithetical to spontaneity or ‘free will’. I will argue that the exact
opposite is true.
Let us re-examine the grandfather paradox, for two of its key features
seem to have gone unnoticed. We need to shift our attention from the death
of Grandfather to the birth of Tim, that is to the first appearance of Tim
in this world. Let us suppose that Tim’s ‘birth’ (i.e. his chronologically
earliest appearance in the world) was earlier than his biological birth from
his mother’s womb. Let us further suppose that the event of Tim’s ‘birth’
did not go unobserved. Say, Tim’s house had earlier been occupied by an
eccentric scientist, who had called another half-a-dozen scientists for tea.
Tim, being a tyro at time travel, appeared bang in the midst of this tea party.
The scientists, true to their profession, merely observed and theorised: they
did not hop around or interfere in what they took to be a demonstration to
challenge their theoretical capabilities, specially arranged by their eccentric
host (who had disappeared into the kitchen). Naturally, they were all blase
enough to regard it as a magic trick in bad taste. (Tim materialised with
one foot on a saucer, and spilled tea on a guest.)
But we know better. We know that, however hard they might have tried,
the scientists could not have found an explanation for the fact which was
presented to them on a platter—no causal explanation that is. We know that
Tim’s appearance at the eccentric tea party really had nothing to do with
anything prior to the tea party; it was causally inexplicable, spontaneous, so
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to say. The event of Tim’s birth could be explained only with reference to
the future.
2.6 Popper’s pond
In the non-mechanical mode of time-travel, involving advanced interactions,
Tim’s ‘birth’ corresponds exactly to Popper’s pond paradox. If a stone is
dropped into a pond, ripples usually spread outwards (corresponding to a
retarded wave). In the advanced case, the ripples converge spontaneously
and throw the stone out of the pond. This sort of thing, though possible
according to physical theory, is not usually observed unless one has filmed
the sequence and plays the film backwards. But, says Popper,15 ‘no physicist
would mistake the end of the film for its beginning; for the creation of a
contracting circular wave followed by a zone of undisturbed water would be
(causally considered) miraculous.’ Popper’s own argument involved coher-
ence: for constructive interference of primary wavelets, to produce a converg-
ing ripple, by Huyghens’ principle, one would need coherence, and this would
be practically impossible to arrange without ‘organization from the centre’.
One can strengthen the first part of Popper’s argument, by giving more
general and stronger arguments which show the theoretical impossibility of
explaining anticipatory phenomena from the past. A causal explanation of
anticipatory phenomena is mathematically impossible for exactly the same
reason that a teleological explanation of purely history dependent phenom-
ena is mathematically impossible. Purely anticipatory phenomena may be
explained only by reference to the future, just as history dependent phenom-
ena may be explained only by reference to the past, for the reasons sketched
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in Figs 3, 4, 5, reproduced from Ref. 7, where they are explained in more
detail. (A quick exposition is also provided in the appendix to this note.)
Figure 3: Three solutions of a retarded equation. The different past histories
prescribed over [−1, 0] all result in the same future for t ≥ 1. Retrodiction
is hence impossible from future data prescribed over t ≥ 1. Teleological
explanations are impossible, with history-dependent evolution.
The pond paradox is now seen to arise from Popper’s metaphysical stipu-
lation that all phenomena must admit a causal explanation, so that phenom-
ena not admitting a causal explanation cannot possibly occur. This position
is reminiscent of the Stoics who derived heimarmene (fate) from eiro (string
beads), so that the evolution of the world was analogous to moving beads on a
necklace; the slightest spontaneous swerve of the atoms (Epicurean clinamen)
would break the string: ‘the cosmos would break up and be shattered. . . if
some uncaused movement were to be introduced into it.16 Perhaps it is nec-
essary to restate that a metaphysical stipulation (‘everything must have an
antecedent cause’), as used e.g. by Hippocrates, may not be used to decide
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Figure 4: Three solutions of an advanced equation: different futures over
[1,2] correspond to the same past for t ≤ 0. With anticipation past fails to
decide the future, for one past may correspond to many futures, in this time
reverse of Fig. 3. Hence, causal explanations are impossible with anticipatory
evolution.
admissible phenomena. The existence or non-existence of the spontaneous
can only be decided by observation.
2.7 The empirical evidence
The absence of hordes of tourists from the future is, therefore, no evidence
against time travel of the second kind. It would be enough if we occasionally
observe some spontaneous events.
2.8 The mechanization of spontaneity
A key feature of spontaneity in the above sense is that spontaneity cannot
be mechanized, i.e., though time travel may be possible, time machines are
not: only time travel of the second kind is possible. Popper’s conclusions
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Figure 5: With a realistic mixture of history-dependence and a small amount
of anticipation, the past still fails to decide the future. With this model, all
phenomena do not admit causal explanations, so that spontaneity really is
possible. The existence of a small tilt is exactly the condition for time-travel
of the second kind.
from his pond paradox only need to be toned down: while the existence of a
causal explanation cannot very well be a precondition for the occurrence of a
phenomenon, without a causal explanation one cannot systematically control
the phenomenon, or arrange for it to occur, or mechanically reproduce it.
The Wellsian time-machine incorporates in its construction the intuitive idea
of ‘control’ from the future. In the physics literature, the same idea was
articulated in the context of the tachyonic anti-telephone: if Shakespeare
used a tachyonic anti-telephone to dictate Hamlet to Bacon then, Benford
et al.17 argued, while Bacon would have chronological priority, Shakespeare
remained the author of Hamlet—since Shakespeare was the one who had
‘control’. But, in a situation where interactions may propagate from future
to past, it is not clear that control from the future is any more possible
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than control from the past, and Fig. 5 sketches a counter-example: in some
situations prescribing both past and future data may still be inadequate to
determine a unique present. Similarly, the classical argument18 to exorcise
Maxwell’s demon excludes only the mechanical form of the demon, which
could lead to a controllable, hence possibly unboundedly large, decrease of
entropy.
2.9 Spontaneity and chance
The relevance of Maxwell’s demon is the following. Spontaneity, in the sense
proposed above, differs from the notion of ‘chance’ in the sense of probabilis-
tic (‘stochastic’) evolution, such as that of a stochastic process, where the
probabilities of future states can be computed once the past states are known.
(The meaning we have assigned to ‘chance’ is related to contemporary cus-
tomary usage amongst physicists: for the last hundred years or so, it has been
argued that probabilistic evolution accounts for entropy increase within clas-
sical reversible dynamics.) Mathematically, the difference is that evolution
involving such ‘chance’ may be modeled by stochastic differential equations
(Fig. 6), categorically distinct from the mixed-type functional differential
equations which model evolution involving a tilt in the arrow of time. In
physical terms, a key difference is that chance corresponds to ‘mixing’ while
spontaneity, in the above sense, corresponds to ‘sorting’.
That is, if the implicit assumption of some kind of ‘mixing’ or quasi-
ergodicity is acceptable as a characteristic feature of ‘chance’ in the sense of
probabilistic evolution, one might say that ‘chance’ results in an increase of
entropy, whereas spontaneity in the above sense (e.g. a converging ripple)
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Figure 6: The figure shows some Brownian sample paths. The sample paths
mix: the trajectories tend to ‘forget’ their past and asymptotically become
statistically independent of it, unlike the background vector field (dashed
lines) which corresponds to solutions of the unperturbed ordinary differential
equation. ‘Mixing’ due to chance is believed to produce entropy rather than
order (= negentropy).
clearly corresponds to a reduction in entropy, or to the creation of order.
So, time travel of the second kind actually corresponds to spontaneous order
creation.
Though general relativistic statistical mechanics (and the statistical ba-
sis of the stress-energy continuum) is problematic, the apparently necessary
association of exotic matter (hence negative energies) with wormhole space-
times suggests, in the standard MTW19 approach to relativistic thermody-
namics, that, one should expect a similar association of entropy reduction
with time travel in the case of wormholes.
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It is natural to conjecture that any macrophysical manifestation of spon-
taneity would involve, in an essential way, the one thing that has remarkably
resisted mechanization: life. Specifically, I expect that a systematic mi-
crophysical tilt in the arrow of time would show up in the structure and
dynamics of biological macromolecules. At present, solutions of the many-
particle equations of motion with a microphysical tilt in the arrow of time
are still being simulated, and compared with solutions of a stochastically
perturbed form of the classical equations, and only preliminary results are
available,20, 21 so that it would not be in order to make a more definite state-
ment. However, some general arguments connecting spontaneity in the above
sense with ‘human freedom’ in the mundane sense of Fig. 1 may be found in
Ref. 7.
At the microphysical level, spontaneity as a necessary correlate of non-
locality is especially interesting in the context (Ref. 7) of the structured-time
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
3 CONCLUSIONS
Time travel conflicts not with choice but with ‘causality’: if two-way interac-
tion with the future is permitted, one can no longer hang on to ‘causality’ in
the sense of demanding explanations exclusively from the past. Interactions
propagating from future to present imply the occurrence of events that are
causally inexplicable. Under the circumstances of time travel, one must allow
for the reality of such spontaneous events, which differ from ‘chance’ events
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in creating order instead of destroying it. The mechanization of spontaneity,
however, is impossible, so that time travel can only be of the second kind.
Appendix
A causal explanation of anticipatory phenomena is mathematically impossi-
ble: following the referee’s suggestion to keep the paper self-contained, we
reproduce here from Ref. 7, some mathematical details of the argument.
First, let us see why a teleological explanation of history-dependent phe-
nomena is mathematically impossible. Fig. 3 shows three solutions of the
retarded functional differential equation (FDE)
x′(t) = b(t)x(t− 1) (1)
where b is a continuous function which vanishes outside [0, 1], and satisfies
∫
b(t) dt = −1 (2)
For example,
b(t) =

0 : t ≤ 0
−1 + cos 2pit : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
0 : t ≥ 1
(3)
For t ≤ 0, the FDE (1) reduces to the ordinary differential equation
(ODE) x′(t) = 0 , so that, for t ≤ 0, x(t) = k for some constant k (= x(0)).
Now, for t ∈ [0, 1],
x(t) = x(0) +
∫ t
0
x′(s)ds
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= x(0) +
∫ t
0
b(s)x(s− 1)ds
= x(0) + x(0)
∫ t
0
b(s)ds (4)
since x(s−1) ≡ k = x(0) for s ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, using (2), x(1) = 0, no matter
what k was. However, since b(t) = 0 for t ≥ 1, the FDE (1) again reduces
to the ODE x′(t) = 0, for t ≥ 1, so that x(1) = 0 implies x(t) = 0 for all
t ≥ 1. Hence, the past of a system governed by (1) cannot be retrodicted
from a knowledge of the entire future; for if the future data (i.e., values of the
function for all future times t ≥ 1) are prescribed using a function φ that is
different from 0 on [1, ∞], then (1) admits no backward solutions for t ≤ 1.
If, on the other hand, φ ≡ 0 on [1, ∞], then there are an infinity of distinct
backward solutions. In either case, knowledge of the entire future furnishes
no information about the past.
The actual solutions shown in the graph were obtained numerically, using
the retard package of Hairer et al.22
In the advanced case, as suggested by Fig. 4, the argument is the time-
symmetric counterpart of the above argument. In this case, the equation
solved was the analogous advanced FDE
x′(t) = b(t)x(t+ 1) (5)
where the function b has the same properties as before, except that
∫
b(t)dt = 1 (6)
For example,
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b(t) =

0 : t ≤ 0
1− cos 2pit : 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
0 : t ≥ 1
(7)
The reasoning proceeds in an entirely analogous manner. For t ≥ 1, the
FDE (5) reduces to the ODE x′(t) = 0, so that, for t ≥ 1, x(t) = k for some
constant k (= x(1)).
Now, for t ∈ [0, 1],
x(t) = x(1)−
∫ t
0
x′(s)ds
= x(1)−
∫ t
0
b(s)x(s+ 1)ds
= x(1)− x(1)
∫ t
0
b(s)ds (8)
since x(s+1) ≡ k = x(1) for s ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, using (6), x(0) = 0, no matter
what k was. However, since b(t) = 0 for t ≤ 0, the FDE (5) again reduces
to the ODE x′(t) = 0, for t ≤ 0, so that x(0) = 0 implies x(t) = 0 for all
t ≤ 1. Hence, the future of a system governed by (5) cannot be predicted
from a knowledge of the entire past; for if the past data (i.e., values of the
function for all past times t ≤ 0) are prescribed using a function φ that is
different from 0 on [−∞, 0], then (5) admits no forward solutions. If, on the
other hand, φ ≡ 0 on [−∞, 0], then there are an infinity of distinct forward
solutions. In either case, precise knowledge of the entire past furnishes no
information about the future. The actual numerical solutions shown were
obtained by a time-symmetric modification of the retard package.
Fig. 5 shows solutions of the mixed-type equation
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x′(t) = a(t)x(t− 1) + b(t)x(t+ 1) (9)
where b has the same properties as in (6), and the continuous function a now
has support on the interval [2, 3], and satisfies
∫ 3
2
a(t)dt = −1 (10)
The solutions may be obtained by combining the reasoning used in the pre-
ceding two cases.
Physically, retarded FDE arise as the equations of motion of charged
particles, using the Heaviside-Lorentz force law, and assuming fully retarded
Lienard-Wiechert potentials.7, 20, 21 Mixed-type equations arise as the equa-
tions of motion of charged particles in the case where most electromagnetic
radiation is retarded, but some of it may be advanced, i.e., we use a convex
combination of retarded and advanced Lienard-Wiechert potentials. This
possibility has often been excluded on metaphysical grounds, without study-
ing the immediate empirical consequence (of spontaneity), here and now, of
this assumption.
Finally, in the case of Fig. 6 the equation solved was a stochastic differ-
ential equation of the type
dXt = a(t, Xt)dt+ b(t, Xt)dw(t) (11)
where w(t) is the standard Brownian motion (Wiener process). The back-
ground vector field relates to the deterministic part of this equation, obtained
using only the drift function a(t, Xt) and setting the dispersion function
b(t, Xt) to zero. The sample paths shown in the figure were obtained using
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this author’s package stochode for the solution of stochastic differential
equations (SDE’s) driven by Brownian or Le´vy motion.
Given the vast difference between the mathematical theory underlying
SDE’s (‘chance’) and that underlying mixed-type FDE’s (‘spontaneity’) it is
surprising why it should be hard to discriminate between the physical conse-
quences of the two. In the case of SDE’s (‘chance’) the future is epistemically
uncertain since (a) the past is uncertain, and (b) the relation of past to future
is probabilistic rather than deterministic. In the case of mixed-type FDE’s
(‘spontaneity’), the future is ontically uncertain, regardless of knowledge of
the past, because past does not entirely determine the future
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